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Abstract
The outgoing tide of EU law will be Britain’s most significant constitutional change in 
recent times. In an era of uncertainties, the UK Supreme Court proved to be a guard-
ian of the constitutional role of Parliament. The case of Miller, decided in the UK 
Supreme Court in 2017, proved that point. The highest court in the UK has there-
fore gained an important place in the global community of Constitutional Courts. This 
global community finds its legitimacy in the recognition of common values as well as 
the recognition of national variations. This article analyses to which extent common 
values, and in particular those found in German law, have influenced decisions in the 
House of Lords and UK Supreme Court. To do so, the author analyses decisions by the 
House of Lords and the Supreme Court and extrajudicial speeches by the Justices of 
the Supreme Court for references to German constitutional law. It identifies and maps 
the themes that have attracted the attention of the justices of the Supreme Court. More 
recently, the UK Supreme Court has referred to judgments and extrajudicial writing by 
German Constitutional Court judges. This was in the context of constitutional ques-
tions relating to the tension between membership within the EU and national iden-
tity, a theme which has occupied German judges for some time. As well as that, the 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights has sparked an interest in 
German jurisprudence, in particular in the principle of proportionality.
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Introduction
The outgoing tide of EU law will be Britain’s most significant constitutional change 
in recent times. In an era of uncertainties, the UK Supreme Court proved to be a 
guardian of the constitutional role of Parliament. The case of Miller,1 decided in 
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the UK Supreme Court in 2017 proved that point. The highest court in the UK 
has therefore gained an important place in the global community of Constitutional 
Courts. This global community finds its legitimacy in the recognition of common 
values as well as the recognition of national variations.
Departure from the EU poses the question as to how the UK Supreme Court will 
relate to common values shared across the EU.
This article analyses to which extent common values, and in particular those 
found in German law, have influenced decisions in the House of Lords and UK 
Supreme Court in the past and whether this will continue after Brexit. To do so, the 
author analyses decisions by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court and extraju-
dicial speeches by the Justices of the Supreme Court for references to German con-
stitutional law. It identifies and maps the themes that have attracted the attention of 
the justices of the Supreme Court and attempts to predict whether the UK Supreme 
Court will continue to take an interest in German Constitutional legal thinking after 
Britain leaves the EU. More recently, the UK Supreme Court has also referred to 
judgments and extrajudicial writing by German Constitutional Court judges. This 
was in the context of constitutional questions relating to the tension between mem-
bership within the EU and national identity, a theme which has occupied German 
judges for some time. As well as that, the interpretation of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights has sparked an interest in German jurisprudence. This article 
assesses whether German constitutional thinking will remain of interest to British 
judges after Brexit.
Europeanization and Legal Cultures
The last words of Jean Monnet, founding father of the European Community, who 
died in 1979: “If I had to the whole thing over again, I would start with the culture”.2
The lack of cultural understanding of each other was addressed in the 1990s to 
some extent with the introduction of the Erasmus University Exchange Programme 
which was aimed at young Europeans.3 Young law students and academics took up 
this opportunity and learnt about differences in EU member states legal systems.
That increased cultural awareness is also a perceived need in UK institutions is 
indicated by the fact that the former Law Lords and the current justices of the UK 
Supreme Court have taken active steps towards understanding legal solutions found 
elsewhere. At the level of legal education and judicial culture, increased awareness 
of a world elsewhere and cooperation within the senior judiciary in Europe started 
to be the practice in the House of Lords since the mid-nineties and later in the UK 
Supreme Court. Lord Reed stated recently that “nowadays it is normal for judges 
to travel around the world to attend conferences, and to hold discussions with for-
eign colleagues. […] In recent years, our most frequent and regular contacts have 
been with the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the 
French Conseil d’État, the Canadian Supreme Court and the United State Supreme 
2 Böckenförde (2017: 365).
3 James (2016: 12).
1 3
German Constitutional Law in the UK Supreme Court 
Court.”4 Understanding each other’s legal culture has also been at the heart of meet-
ings between the highest courts in Europe, namely meetings of judges of the then 
House of Lords and the German Federal Constitutional Court.
Prominent British academics have analysed the influence of European principles 
on the common law: “The common law has, to put it bluntly, begged, stolen and 
borrowed. It is much richer for the European experience. That with respect is the 
common law’s strength. This ‘more principled’ approach would not have occurred 
without our exposure to European legal experience.”5 Common legal problems, 
especially earlier on in areas such as constitutional law, have inspired British judges 
to review solutions found elsewhere. It is to this that attention shall now turn.
Understanding Different Legal Cultures: Constitutional Law
Since the 1960s British courts have seen an increase in Judicial review cases and 
famously the principle of proportionality entered the British courtrooms.6 Inspira-
tions originally derived from German Law appear to have been drawn most promi-
nently in the context of European Union Law and the protection of Human Rights 
since October 2010 under the Human Rights Act 1998.
In German law the principle of proportionality (Verhältnismaβigkeit) plays a very 
important role in reviewing the legality of discretionary decisions in the Administra-
tive courts. Dating back to a decision by the Prussian Oberverwaltungsgericht in 
1882 the Bundesverfassungsgericht has based it on the principle of the Rechtsstaat 
and the Basic Rights.7 In 1911 Fleiner phrased it as “the police should not shoot 
a sparrow with a cannon ball”8 which translates into the English equally simple 
methaphorical image of a nut that should not be cracked with a sledge-hammer. The 
principle is composed of a four step test. First, the state measure concerned must be 
legitimate. Secondly, the measure must be suitable for the purpose of facilitating 
or achieving the pursued objective. Thirdly, the suitable the measure must also be 
necessary, in the sense that the authority concerned has no other mechanism at its 
disposal, which is less restrictive of freedom. […] Finally, the measure concerned 
may not be disproportionate to the restrictions which it involves a degree of balanc-
ing (Zumutbarkeit).9 The principle enjoys constitutional status and has to be applied 
by all public authorities in the exercise of their powers.10
In one of its leading early judgments the Federal Constitutional Court con-
firmed the principle of proportionality in 1958 that an interference with the right 
to freedom to exercise one’s profession in Article 12(1) of the Basic Law has to be 
4 Lord Reed (201).
5 Birkinshaw (2015, 2017).
6 Birkinshaw (2006) and Schwarze (2006).
7 BVerfGE 23, 127.
8 Fleiner (1911).
9 Manssen (2014).
10 Künnecke (2007) with further references.
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proportionate to the aim of regulating the profession of pharmacists (Apothekenur-
teil).11 The German Court’s judgment has been described as the birth hour of the 
principle of proportionality in its constitutional law form.12 In this early decision the 
Court placed strong emphasis on the fourth condition of balancing (Zumutbarkeit). 
This fourth condition of the proportionality test which requires a balancing of the 
involved intersts received a lot of attention in the decision of Bank Mellat in the UK 
Supreme Court in 2013. This ruling has become a blueprint for the application of 
the proportionality test in UK Human Rights cases.13 The Bank Mellat case in 2013 
raised the question whether sanctions imposed by the British Government on an Ira-
nian bank suspected of involvement in the Iranian nuclear missile programme were 
a proportionate interference with the right under the ECHR to peaceful enjoyment 
of possessions. Lord Reed inquires ‘whether the objective of the measure is suffi-
ciently important to justify the limitations of a protected right, whether the measure 
is rationally connected to the objective, whether a less intrusive measure could have 
been used without unacceptably compromising the achievement of the objectivem 
and fourthly whether blanacing the severity of the measure’s effects on the rights of 
the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective to the extent 
that the measure will contribute to its achievements, the former outweighs the latter. 
In essence, the question at step four is whether the impact of the rights infringement 
is disproportionate to the likely benefit fo the impugned measure.14 Lord Reed’s dis-
cussion of the concept of proportionality in that case, which has been cited in many 
subsequent cases, was influenced by discussions with Prof Dr Gertrude Lübbe-
Wolff, then a judge at the German constitutional court, at the meetings I mentioned 
earlier.15
Indeed, the German Federal Constitutional Court follows a similar pattern. In the 
case of Ramelow,16decided in 2013, the highest German Court had to assess whether 
the gathering of information about of a politician of the German party ‘Die Linke’ 
was a disproportionate interference with Mr Ramelow’s right to independence as 
a member of the German parliament as protected in the German Constitution.17 It 
concluded that even though the observation was carried out in an open manner and 
not in secret, the measure was disproportionate. The Federal Constitutional Court 
applied the four stage test and reviewed whether the objective of the measure was 
legitimate, whether it was suitable, whether a less intrusive measure could have 
been used and it carried out an overall balancing of all arguments for and against the 
14 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] AC 700, para 74.
15 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39; [2014] AC 700, paras 68–76.
16 BVerfGE 134, 141. https ://www.bunde sverf assun gsger icht.de/Share dDocs /Entsc heidu ngen/
EN/2013/09/rs201 30917 _2bvr2 43610 en.html, last Accessed 15/02/2019.
17 Article 38 Section 1 sentence 1 of the Basic Law safeguards communication between a member of 
Parliament and the voters that is free from governmental influence, a s well as the member of Parlia-
ment’s freedom from observation, supervision and oversight by the executive branch.
11 BVerfGE 7, 377 [1958].
12 Möller (2012).
13 An ABC on proportionality: with Bank Mellat s our primer, UKHRB, UK Human Rights Blog, 1 
Crown Office Row.
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measure.18 Recent German academic commentary and case law shows that this last 
part of the test, the balancing test leaves room for further refinement19: The balanc-
ing process should include the interests of a wide circle of poeple, not just in relation 
of plaintiff and the state. Further, the affected interests require a weighting, in par-
ticular constitutional values need to be paid attention to. Particular intense interfer-
ence with a constitutonal might need to be compensated. Another problem discussed 
under the heading of balancing under the fourth limb of the proportionality inquiry 
is the question of how to assess several cumulative measure which potentially inter-
fere with a protected right. Further, a measure might affect several rights and this 
would need to be balanced at the final stage of the proportionality inquiry. Finally, it 
is emphasised that the affected interests require a value judgments, in particular with 
regard to constitutional values which require special protection.20
In the 2015 case of Pham,21 such a constitutional right, the right to British citi-
zenship was at stake in the UK Supreme Court. The Court reviewed the principle 
of rationality under English administrative law and discussed the principle of pro-
portionality in great detail. After Pham, it seems that proportionality has gained a 
strong position in English Administrative law irrespective of whether there is an EU 
or ECHR context.22 The judgment contains reference by Lord Mance (who speaks 
German fluently) to comments made by the German judge Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff23: 
“In short, proportionality is as Professor Dr Lübbe-Wolff (former judge of the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht which originated the term’s modern use) put it in The Princi-
ple of Proportionality in the case-law of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(2014) 34 HRLJ 12, 1-17 –‘a tool directing attention to different aspects of what 
is implied in any rational assessment of the reasonableness of a restriction’, ‘just a 
rationalising heuristic tool’.”24 Lord Mance held in his speech that for the applica-
tion of the application of the principle of proportionality it was context that was 
important and not the question whether the case is concerned with EU, ECHR or 
common law. Lord Mance described citizenship as a constitutional right that is “as 
fundamental at common law as it is in European and international law”.25
Another area where German Constitutional Law has had an influence is the rela-
tionship between national constitutional law and EU law. The concepts of judicial 
co-operation26 national constitutional identity27 and Gerichtsverbund28 coined in 
18 BVerfGE 134, 141.
 https ://www.bunde sverf assun gsger icht.de/Share dDocs /Entsc heidu ngen/EN/2013/09/rs201 30917 _2bvr2 
43610 en.html, last Accessed 15/02/2019.
19 Manssen (2015: 99) and Möller (2012).
20 Manssen (2015: 100).
21 Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19; [2015] 1 WLR 1592, para 96.
22 Elliott, Mark, https ://publi clawf oreve ryone .com/2015/04/17/propo rtion ality -and-conte xtual ism-in-
commo n-law-revie w-the-supre me-court s-judgm ent-in-pham/m last Accessedd 15/02/2019.
23 Lord Reed (2017).
24 Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19; [2015] 1 WLR 1592, para 96.
25 Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19; [2015] 1 WLR 1592, para 97.
26 BVerfGE 89, 155 < 175 > – Maastricht.
27 BVerfG, Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 30. Juni 2009 – 2 BvE 2/08 – Lisbon.
28 BVerfG, Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 30. Juni 2009 – 2 BvE 2/08 – Lisbon.
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German Constitutional Law cases were referred to in 2014. In the HS2 decision29 
the UK Supreme Court decided that established principles enshrined in the Brit-
ish constitution could not be ignored when they conflicted with EU law. The case 
was brought by objectors to the HS2 high-speed rail link. They had claimed that the 
decision-making process was failing to comply with the environmental assessment 
directive. The judges dismissed the claims. The principle in question was the long-
established constitutional principle governing the relationship between Parliament 
and the courts, as reflected in article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. In their judgment, 
the justices referred to German Constitutional legal thinking. This openness to for-
eign constitutional jurisprudence may be explained by the changing nature of the 
British constitution.
For some time, the British Constitution has been characterised by gradual change 
and reform and the current position in British Constitutional Law has been described 
as “unsettled”30 and the opinions of the political elites are shaped by deep “anxieties 
dressed up in the language of “sovereignty”.31 Concerns about loss of sovereignty 
at national level and the fragmentation of statehood in a European system that lacks 
political and cultural union have been raised in Germany too. Ernst Wolfgang Böck-
enförde, former president of the German Federal Constitutional Court wrote as early 
as 1998 about this.32 His recently published writings, translated into the English lan-
guage, tackle the question that the EU law making process is “distant and foreign” 
form the citizens and that there is no sense of a “European people”.33
Böckenförde is fully aware of the deficiencies of EU integration and warned that 
‘banking on the market-economic approach as the vehicle and motor of Europe’s inte-
gration will not lead to greater unity, but to greater separation and a dead end’.34 Those 
voices in Britain who argued the case for Brexit might find vindication in some of his 
work. However, Böckenförde, calls for more efforts into shaping a European people by 
encouraging more integration in the field of education and culture. This would include 
the obligatory teaching of three foreign languages and the setting up of European 
schools and universities,35 implying that we can overcome loss of national sovereignty 
with the means of education and the establishment of an educated European people. 
Further and rather different to the ideology of the supporters of Brexit, Böckenförde 
sees the protection of all citizen’s rights through the jurisprudence of the Court of Jus-
tice as a sufficiently effective process which remedies the lack of political participation. 
So legal protection through an institution which safeguards the markets citizen’s rights, 
is seen as a satisfactory means of counterbalancing the loss of national sovereignty.
By contrast, “The [UK] constitution is no more and no less than what happens.”36 
Constitutional adjudication as provided for in the German constitution and also in 
29 R (Buckinghampshire County Council) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3.
30 Walker (2014) and Gee and Young (2016).
31 Gee and Young (2016).
32 Böckenförde (2017: 341).
33 Böckenförde (2017: 341).
34 Böckenförde (2017: 363).
35 Böckenförde (2017: 365).
36 Griffiths (1979).
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the CJEU is a mechanism that does not sit easily with the British constitutional 
identity. Some have argued that “such readings of the constitution occupy no single 
clear position, but an indistinct spectrum of possibilities.”37 These references create 
the impression that the constitution is a blank canvas and famously very flexible. 
However, it should not be overlooked that Britain’s political culture has long been 
hesitant to resolve constitutional matters in the courts. Despite the flexibility of the 
British constitution, judicial power is not limitless and the UK Supreme Court’s role 
after Brexit is not easy to predict. The 2016 Referendum on EU membership trans-
formed the British constitution, in the words of Neil Walker, into an “area of raw, 
political competition”.38 This kind of realism remained almost unconstrained until 
the Supreme Court in the Miller judgement39 in 2017 clarified that Parliamentary 
involvement was constitutionally required in triggering Article 50. Developments in 
British constitutional law even before 2016 have been described as follows: “The 
message is one of a slow burn of reforms, followed by a marked increase in the 
constitutional temperature. […] The assault comes from many quarters. It comes 
from the rival legal supremacy claim of an ever more judicially assertive and juris-
dictionally encroaching EU…”40 The EU referendum 2016 can be seen as the politi-
cal and legal thermometer having reached boiling temperature. This heated moment 
will serve as a catalyst for an increased need to redefine constitutional principles 
and institutional roles. Withdrawal from the European Union immediately posed the 
constitutional question as to who was to trigger Article 50. The Supreme Court, in 
its concise Miller judgment41 addressed the question of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
in great detail. Further, the Withdrawal Bill itself raises constitutional questions, 
such as whether Henry VIII clauses might contravene the rule of law.42 Henry VIII 
clauses are added to a Bill to provide the Government with a mechanism to amend it 
once the Bill has become an Act of Parliament. This ensures that primary legislation 
can be amended by subordinate legislation without having to pass through parlia-
mentary scrutiny.
These provisions are known as Henry VIII clauses and they derive their name 
from the Statute of Proclamations 1539 which granted King Henry VIII power to 
legislate by proclamation.43 It will give the government power to amend all EU 
derived primary and secondary derived EU law without the usual parliamentary 
37 Walker (2014: 538).
38 Walker (2014: 532).
39 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
40 Walker (2014: 535).
41 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
42 Anthony (2017).
43 http://www.parli ament .uk/site-infor matio n/gloss ary/henry -viii-claus es/ Accessed 29th December 
2017.
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checks required for amending legislation and this could raise constitutional 
concerns.44
The question remains, to which extent can German constitutional reasoning be 
of use to the UK Supreme Court? German constitutional reasoning has a long tradi-
tion and is often described as having a “high level of conceptual sophistication”.45 
Discussing German and Austrian constitutional thought, Andras Jakab observes that 
the “two Germanic styles are clearly distinct from the French and British styles of 
constitutional reasoning. On both sides of the Channel, different conceptions of the 
role of legal scholars and the lack (or late affirmation) of constitutional review have 
both contributed to a lower level of sophistication in constitutional reasoning.”46 As 
to the style of German constitutional doctrine, it “still employs many basic terms 
from the period of constitutional monarchy.”47
Research into the language used by the German Constitutional court notes that 
some of the concepts and terms used are not strictly legal terms but often in the 
form of compound nouns “and somewhat mysterious”.48 The concepts of judicial 
co-operation and Gerichtsverbund introduced in the Lisbon judgement by that court 
fits neatly into this category. The descriptive and flexible nature of these concepts 
allows for an element of discretion in the interpretation of the meaning which makes 
them fit for use in other jurisdictions.
Evidently, the idea of a co-operative relationship with the European Court of Jus-
tice as developed by the German Constitutional Court was never used by the Ger-
man Court to defy European Union Law. However, the lack of clarity in this concept 
encouraged the UK Supreme Court to adopt it in its HS2 decision.
The UK Supreme Court as Neutral Guardian of Constitutional Principles
In more recent decisions, the UK Supreme Court has focused on constitutional 
principles which require protection. In the HS2 decision49 the UK Supreme Court 
decided that established principles enshrined in the British constitution could not be 
ignored when they conflicted with EU law. The principle in question was the long-
established constitutional principle governing the relationship between Parliament 
and the courts, as reflected in article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. The UK Supreme 
Court found inspiration in German Constitutional jurisprudence:
The Supreme Court in paragraph 111 cited the German Court’s ruling in the Ger-
man language:
“There is in addition much to be said for the view, advanced by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court in its judgment of 24 April 2013 on the Counter-
44 European Union (Withdrawal Bill) HC Bill 147, https ://publi catio ns.parli ament .uk/pa/bills /cbill /2017-
2019/0147/cbill _2017-20190 147_en_2.htm#pb3-l1g7 last Accessed 29th December 2017.
45 Jakab (2009: 953).
46 Jakab (2017: 608).
47 Jakab (2009: 953).
48 Jakab (2009: 954).
49 R (Buckinghampshire County Council) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3.
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Terrorism Database Act, 1 BvR 1215/07, para 91, that as part of a co-operative 
relationship, a decision of the European Court of Justice should not be read 
by a national court in a way that places in question the identity of the national 
constitutional order (“Im Sinne eines kooperativen Miteinanders zwischen 
dem Bundesverfassungsgericht und dem Europäischen Gerichtshof… darf 
dieser Entscheidung keine Lesart unterlegt werden, nach der diese offensi-
chtlich als Ultra-vires-Akt zu beurteilen wäre oder Schutz und Durchsetzung 
der mitgliedstaatlichen Grundrechte in einer Weise gefährdete…, dass dies die 
Identität der durch das Grundgesetz errichteten Verfassungsordnung in Frage 
stellte”).” And further, in paragraph 202 the Supreme Court continues: “In a 
not so dissimilar context, the German Federal Constitutional Court noted in 
its judgment of 24 April 2013—1 BvR 1215/07, (para 91)—that decisions of 
the European Court of Justice must be understood in the context of the coop-
erative relationship (“Im Sinne eines kooperativen Miteinanders”) which exists 
between that Court and a national constitutional court such as the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht or a supreme court like this [the UK Supreme] Court.”
When taking a closer look at the concept of ‘co-operative relationship’ as applied in 
the case of HS2 it becomes evident that the Supreme Court is using the reference to 
German constitutional reasoning in order to defy European Union Law. “Compara-
tive law and comparative legal scholarship assumes an intriguing dual role in these 
processes (Europeanisation). Traditionally, comparative law has been portrayed as 
the positive ally and a bit of a servant of EU law. Through comparative analysis, 
EU law and EU law scholarship generates common principles, the common law of 
Europe […].50 In mutual horizontal exchanges or studies, comparison of national 
laws is not a tool for creating commonality, but for the re-affirmation of diversity.”51 
The non-Europeanization of some areas of national law is then again a commonality 
between national legal systems which are developing a stronger national identity.[
More recently, the German Constitutional Court has confirmed and refined the 
cooperative relationship with the European Court of Justice. In the Outright Mon-
etary Transaction (OMT) judgement52 which was decided 2 days before the EU ref-
erendum in the UK, the German Court held that the OMT decision of the European 
Central Bank did not violate German Constitutional Law.53
As Andreas Voβkuhle, the president of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
had emphasised, the Court confirms in the OMT decision that Article 267 TFEU 
is the expression of a shared responsibility in a co-operation between national and 
European law.54
Justice Voβkule acknowledges that it is a difficult balancing act between Euro-
pean integration in the sense of taking EU-friendly decisions as well as living up 
50 See for instance Schwarze (2006) and Künnecke (2007).
51 Von Bogdandy and Huber (2017: 672).
52 (2 be 13/13) unreported 21 June 2016 (BVerfG (Ger).
53 Frenz (2017: 577).
54 Voβkuhle (2015).
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to the task of safeguarding national constitutional identity.55 The German Constitu-
tional Court is trying to avoid a loop-sided approach. One solution to this dilemma 
is the stronger integration of the national parliaments in the European decision-mak-
ing processes.56 This reminds of the position taken by both the High Court and the 
Supreme Court in the case of Miller.57 The democratic process as expressed by the 
democratically legitimised members of the House of Parliament was upheld in this 
decision and it was the Supreme Court which established an orderly process within 
constitutional parameters.
The UK Supreme Court and the Fragmenting Political Community
Böckenförde’s thesis on how to relieve the tension between Globalisation, Europe-
anization and Individualization suggests the “recognition of diversity: solution to 
the problem through a federal layering is possible and appropriate. This relativizes 
and defuses initially unresolvable dissent that exists among people by granting them 
a creative cultural-political sphere of their own. The recognition of diversity thus 
allows the otherwise fragmenting political community to stay together after all, to 
integrate itself anew.”58
The UK Supreme Court’s role in deciding devolved matters, for instance, might 
be of increasing relevance in the coming years. Surprisingly, no cases with regard to 
the Scottish referendum for independence or Northern Irish devolution arrangements 
have been heard yet. The core devolution case law from these jurisdictions has come 
from challenges brought by private parties, such as AXA, Imperial Tobacco, the 
Scotch Whisky Association and, most recently, the Christian Institute and the Fam-
ily Education Trust.”59 It remains to be seen to which extent the historical hesitance 
to resolve matters in the courts will change in the times of constitutional change. 
Clause 9 of the EU Withdrawal Bill, for instance, allows for delegated legislation to 
amend constitutional statutes. This power is problematic and it has been argued that 
this Henry VIII clause could be unconstitutional.60
Recent plans in agreeing on a deal for exiting the European Union include a 
degree of “regulatory alignment” between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland.61 The exact meaning of this term was hotly debated at the time of writing 
and it remains to be seen what exactly is meant by that. The agreement promises 
to ensure that there will be no hard border and to uphold the Belfast agreement. It 
clarifies that the whole UK including Northern Ireland will be leaving the customs 
union. However, how the open border will be secured and how ‘full alignment’ with 
55 Voβkuhle (2015: 15).
56 Voβkuhle (2015: 16).
57 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
58 Böckenförde (2017: 337).
59 Tomkins (2017).
60 Anthony (2017).
61 https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/polit ics/blog/live/2017/dec/05/there sa-may-strug gles-to-rescu e-brexi 
t-deal-as-dubli n-says-it-wont-back-down-polit ics-live?page=with:block -5a26a 3f183 311a0 66ae8 
add5#block -5a26a 3f183 311a0 66ae8 add5; Accessed 5/12/207; see also Scoutaris (2017).
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the rules of the customs union and the single marked will be guaranteed remains 
unclear. It was agreed that no new regulatory barriers will be introduced between 
Northern Ireland and the UK. This would have to be permitted by the Northern Irish 
executive Stormont in order to secure the Good Friday Agreement.62 With little sub-
stance found in the current agreement, the Irish Border issue remains a topic for 
further negotiations. It will be interesting to see whether these differences will be 
evened out during the political debates and negotiations in passing the Withdrawal 
Bill or whether the UK Supreme Court will play an increased role in securing the 
devolved region’s positions.
The UK Constitution: Consolidation on the Inside and Assertion 
Against the Outside
Böckenförde’s theme whether democracy and statehood are able to withhold the 
pressure exerted by globalisation, Europeanisation and individualisation has never 
been more relevant than at the current time. Britain is approaching a constitutional 
moment which will have implications for the economy, the legal relations between 
European states, and the type of rights people living in Britain will have. Böcken-
förde, in assessing the pressures on constitutions remarked long before the consti-
tutional changes in the UK could have been anticipated: “Two aspects, in particular, 
must be considered in this regard: consolidation on the inside and assertion against 
the outside.”63
Consolidation on the inside will be an important theme in terms of Realpolitik 
as well as legal and institutional safeguards. The aim of this article was to show that 
the UK Supreme Court has increasingly taken on the role of a Constitutional Court. 
It has shown openness to engage with different legal cultures in and found inspi-
ration in German Constitutional jurisprudence. The question remains whether the 
UK Supreme Court will develop into an even stronger actor within the British insti-
tutional framework. The success of the Supreme Court will depend on its accept-
ance on the inside. In other words, the people in the United Kingdom need to gain 
increasing confidence in this Court as the Guardian of constitutional principles. The 
UK Supreme Court received significant criticism in the popular media in 2017 after 
it handed down its decision in the case of Miller,64 which required Parliamentary 
involvement in the triggering of Article 50 TFEU. More will be said about accept-
ance of constitutional adjudication in a later part of this article.
Miller has been described as the most important constitutional case the UK 
Supreme Court has ever decided: “and it boils down to this: the government requires 
the authority of primary legislation before it can change the laws of the UK consti-
tution. It is a reminder of the function of a constitution and of the rule of law. It is 
62 https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/uk-news/2017/dec/08/main-point s-of-agree ment-uk-eu-brexi t-deal; 
Accessed 8/12/2017.
63 Böckenförde (2017: 337).
64 [2017] UKSC 5.
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a testament to the independence of the judiciary at a time when it has come under 
pressure from the media and some politicians. It is a re-statement of the obvious 
when all the other questions surrounding withdrawal from the EU are uncertain. The 
legal and procedural issues have now been re solved.”65
Miller66 is an important case because it deals with the question of how “British 
lawyers understand their constitution, in particular, how to accommodate constitu-
tional innovations such as EU membership, referendums and devolution.”67 It clari-
fied that the sovereignty of Parliament had to be upheld in the light of a powerful 
executive, ironically the very part of British constitutional law that the opponents of 
the judgments wish to rescue from corrosion by EU law.
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has an important role in defining the 
constitutional identity of the country. In HS268 the UK Supreme Court “embraced 
the idea that the primacy accorded to EU law by the European Communities Act 
1972 might not be absolute. “Most notably it aligned itself with the rulings of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) and rejected the 
notion of “unqualified primacy over national law”.69
Another question that is currently unanswered is what kind of role the CJEU will 
play in the British judicial landscape. Theresa May has made it clear that the CJEU 
should seize to have jurisdiction over the United Kingdom.70 The EU27 however, 
have made it clear that they envisage a continuing role for the CJEU in respect of the 
UK, not least because the withdrawal deal itself may raise legal issues concerning 
citizens’ rights and disputes with regard to the enforcement of the withdrawal agree-
ment.71 In the document agreed by Theresa May to conclude the first phase in the 
negotiation, the Court of Justice will maintain the role of safeguarding the rights of 
EU citizens for 8 years after the withdrawal from the EU.72
The UK Supreme Court would continue in its strong role as guardian of British 
constitutional principles and express the need for the CJEU to refine its reasoning as 
well as to respect constitutional limitations based in the British constitution.73 The 
UK Supreme Court’s relationship with the CJEU will remain a topic for many years 
to come.
65 Murkens (2017); In a less spectacular manner the case of Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] 
3 WLR 247, [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] QB 151 in the High Court had raised the issue of consti-
tutional statutes and displayed features of German constitutional reasoning.
66 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
67 Daly (2017: 91).
68 [2014] UKSC 3.
69 Arnull (2017: 41).
70 Arnull (2017: 44).
71 XT 2016/17 ADD 1 REV 2.
72 https ://ec.europ a.eu/commi ssion /sites /beta-polit ical/files /joint _repor t.pdf.
73 Arnull (2017: 44).
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Acceptance of Constitutional Jurisprudence
Acceptance in the population of the courts is a crucial aspect to secure the liberal 
state. Constitutional values cannot be protected fully through institutional protec-
tion, the judgments of the courts have to find acceptance in order for the law to func-
tion as a peacemaker.74
However, uncertainty over the role of the judges has been expressed recently by 
the former president of the UK Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger.75 He expresses 
concern for one of the fundamental constitutional principles in the unwritten con-
stitution: “The Rule of Law in UK [is] at risk after Brexit”. Four senior judges 
warned that the process of leaving of the EU lacked in detail and could overwhelm 
the Supreme Court as well as place strain on the independence of British judges. 
They express concern about the uncomfortably wide discretion left to the judges”.76 
This indicates that there is concern about the acceptance of judgements by the UK 
Supreme Court.
Whilst the UK Supreme Court gave some of its strongest judgements in terms 
of resisting the pressures stemming from membership within the EU, in 2016 Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Mance were both named as the most euro-friendly judges, 
which in the then political climate was not seen as a compliment by members of 
the public who had voted for Brexit.77 The Miller litigation which upheld the prin-
ciple of Parliamentary Sovereignty cast a populist light on the highest judges in the 
land and this raises the question whether British courts, and in particular the UK 
Supreme Court are too distant from the people to enjoy acceptance and instil faith in 
the population to act as the guardian of constitutional principles in uncertain times. 
By contrast, the German Federal Constitutional Court, whilst suffering from a lack 
of acceptance in the early days, was usually supported by the German media.78 A 
notable exception from the supportive response in the media was the “Soldiers are 
murderers” decision by that Court in 1994 when it ruled that that statement was cov-
ered by freedom of speech.79
It has been argued, more generally that the courts interfere too much and that 
sometimes annoy the people. However, “the courts ensure that this ‘dissatisfaction’ 
can be channelled into the political system and that the citizens have an outlet for 
their grievances. Much as we may lament individual decisions and judgements, it is 
difficult to see who else could perform this function.”80
The real question is, how do courts maintain their acceptance. Some might think 
that the courts are too elitist to put up with the current stream of populist politics 
in the world. Ultimately, the courts need to find acceptance in the population, they 
74 Limbach (1999: 165).
75 Lord Neuberger (2017).
76 Lord Neuberger (2017).
77 Daily Mail 3 December 2016.
78 Lamprecht (2011).
79 BVerfGE 93, 266 - 312 I. Senate Soldiers-murderers 1 BvR 1476, 1980/91 and 102,221/https ://law.
utexa s.edu/trans natio nal/forei gn-law-trans latio ns/germa n/case.php?id=620. Accessed 10/12/2017.
80 Qvortrup (2015).
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need to be accessible, explain what they are doing and it needs to be made clear 
that they are acting in the people’s interest.81 It is therefore timely that Lady Hale, 
President of the UK Supreme Court, announced on 27th November 2017 that it will 
hear two full Human Rights law cases in Belfast in 2018 at the Inns of Court Library 
at the Royal Courts of Justice in Belfast.82 Further, Lady Brenda Hale, the President 
of the UK Supreme Court has shared her advice to would be lawyers and wrote in 
the Guardian about her career and the need for diversity in the legal profession.83 
It is a sign that the highest court in the country is aware of its unifying function in 
the British constitutional arrangement and that it has to be transparent and open to 
local people. This is a new trend. Only once the UK’s highest court has sat away 
from Westminster when it heard a case in Edinburgh in early 2017, and a hearing 
in Cardiff is planned for 2019.84 Hale explained the decision thus: “My colleagues 
and I strongly believe that the experience of watching a case in person should not be 
limited to those within easy reach of London. This is the second time that the court 
has sat outside London.” It shows that the court wants to promote its openness and 
accessibility and in hearing a controversial Human Rights case in Northern Ireland 
its visibility as a unifying and neutral institution is heightened. This is an important 
step towards securing a more visible role for the Supreme Court.
In order to secure acceptance, the German Constitutional Court was located in the 
rather unspectacular city of Karlsruhe in Southern Germany, far away from Bonn or 
Berlin. The somewhat modest building was designed by Berlin architect Paul Baum-
garten. The open structure symbolises democratic transparency and forms a mod-
ern contrast to the 19th-century style palaces of justice.85Today the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has a very special position in modern Germany. Since 1951 it 
has played the important role in guarding the constitution in the name of the peo-
ple.86 It is difficult to assess the future development of constitutional adjudication 
in the UK Supreme Court but the tasks ahead with a view to new trade agreements, 
interpreting case law by the Court of Justice of the EU, border arrangements and 
devolution issues indicate that the role of this Court could become more political 
than in the past. It is important that it can carry out its functions free from pressure 
and that it secures the acceptance of its rulings in the population.
Some may argue that the constitutional identities of Germany and Britain are his-
torically different and that the UK Supreme Court’s role is unalike. The identity of 
81 McIntyre (2017).
82 Website of the UK Supreme Court, https ://www.supre mecou rt.uk/news/uk-supre me-court -bound -for-
north ern-irela nd.htmla ccess ed on 1/12/2017.
83 The Guardian, 15th February 2018.
84 https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/law/2017/nov/27/uk-supre me-court -to-sit-in-north ern-irela nd-for-the-
first -time; Accessed 8/12/2017; One of the cases is the Lee v Ashers Bakery Company Ltd which related 
to the question whether a bakery discriminated against a customer when it refused to add the slogan 
“Support Gay marriage” on the ordered cake.
85 http://www.bunde sverf assun gsger icht.de/EN/Gebae ude/gebae ude_node.html;jsess ionid =9C83F 
1D439 71BD0 DE96E 3ACBB 94BBF 55.2_cid39 4; Accessed 8/12/2017.
86 Böckenförde (2017: 186).
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the British constitution is indeed different and it has been referred to as “invisible”87 
as opposed to its Germanic counterpart. The British constitutional model has been 
described as locating the ultimate source of constitutional legitimacy in the people 
and that “parliament is the true representative of the people”.88 The principle of Par-
liamentary Sovereignty is historically grown and not contained in a codified docu-
ment but there is debate on what the nature of Parliamentary Sovereignty is. If it 
is characterised as a principle of the common law as asserted in Thoburn, Jackson 
and Axa then courts could modify the principle like other common law principles.89 
Common law constitutionalism in this vein poses a threat to the traditional notion of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty and upholds the rule of law. However, it clearly has to be 
born in mind that this is a much more understated and almost invisible form of scru-
tiny compared to the powers of the German Federal Constitutional Court. It remains 
to be seen whether common law constitutionalism will be energised after withdrawal 
from the EU or not.
Conclusion
For several decades the UK Supreme Court (former House of Lords) has forged 
links with continental judges as well as judges trained in other common law juris-
dictions. More recently the broader constitutional questions raised by membership 
within the EU have led to an interest in solutions found in the German Constitu-
tional Court. It is not suggested that the transparent German Constitutional Court 
model suits the British constitutional landscape. The role of the UK Supreme Court 
and its legitimacy to resolve constitutional conflict is different from the elected Ger-
man counterpart. However, this article has shown that the problems faced by these 
two countries are not dissimilar. The UK Supreme Court has, for quite some time 
now, developed its role in protecting the common law and its less visible principles.
Inside the United Kingdom new challenges are already taking shape in the form 
of demands for regional autonomy and potential changes to citizen’s right under EU 
law.
On the outside, there will have to be a new arrangement with the EU in how to 
trade and how to relate to the EU institutions, most notably in how to relate to the 
CJEU. These challenges will have to be addressed soon and it appears as if Brexit 
has served as a catalyst for a clearer articulation of what the United Kingdom Com-
mon Law Constitution mean to the people. It will require an assertive institution to 
protect this reaffirmed constitution.
87 Rosenfeld (2012: 767).
88 Rosenfeld (2012: 767).
89 Gee and Young (2016: 12).
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Like membership within the EU, departure from the European Union, might 
generate a more legalistic reassessment of what the UK constitution contains.90 In 
the words of the former president of the Israeli Supreme Court Aharon Barak Com-
parative Law is “an experienced friend”.91 It is hoped that all the highest courts in 
Europe will continue sharing their experiences.
Compliance with Ethical Standards 
Conflict of interest All the authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Anthony, Gordon. 2017. House of Lords, Constitution Committee, 6 December 2017.
Arnull, Anthony. 2017. The UK Supreme Court and References to the CJEU. Yearbook of European Law 
36: 314.
Barak, Aharon. 2005. Response to The Judge as Comparatist in Public Law. Yale Law School Legal 
Scholarship Repository 80: 195.
Birkinshaw, Patrick. 2006. European Public Law, 2014. European Administrative Law: Jürgen Schwarze.
Birkinshaw, Patrick, 2017. United Kingdom Judges and European Integration, p 22. https ://hydra .hull.
ac.uk/asset s/hull:11685 /conte nt. Accessed 13 Nov 2017.
Birkinshaw, Patrick. 2015. Das Verhältnis der Richter des Vereinigten Königreichs zu Europa und der 
europäischen Integration, Kompetenzen, Grundrechte und Identität. Europarecht 267: 289.
Böckenförde, Ernst Wolfgang. 2017. Constitutional and Political Theory, 337. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Cherry, James. 2016. Brexit: What now for Study Mobility between the UK and the EU. Pécs Journal of 
International and European Law 7: 12.
Daly, Paul. 2017. Miller: Legal and Political Fault Lines. Public Law. https ://doi.org/10.17863 /
CAM.12077 .
Fleiner, Fritz. 1911. Institutionen des deutschen Verwaltungsrecht, 1st ed, 323. Tübingen: Mohr.
Frenz, Walter, and Case Comment. 2017. No Judicial Brexit of the German Federal Constitutional Court. 
European Law Journal 4: 577.
Gee, Graham, Young, Alison L. 2016. Regaining Sovereignty? Brexit, the UK Parliament and the Com-
mon Law. European Public Law 22 (1): 131–147.
Griffith, John. 1979. The Political Constitution. The Modern Law Review 42(1): 1–21.
Jakab, Andras. 2017. Publication Review, European Constitutional Language, European Law Review. 608 
referring to chapter 5.
Jakab, Andras. 2017b. Two Opposed Paradigm of Constitutional Continental Thinking: Austria and Ger-
many. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 58(4): 933–955.
Künnecke, Martina. 2007. Tradition and Change, An Anglo-German Comparison. Berlin: Springer.
90 “Oral Evidence Session with Rt Hon Michael Gove M.P., Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for 
Justice” (The House of Lords Select Constitution Committee, 2 December 2015, question 9, page 14, 
15. https ://www.parli ament .uk/docum ents/lords -commi ttes/const ituti on/Annua lOral Evide nce20 14-15/
CC021 215-LC.pdf.
91 Barak (2005).
1 3
German Constitutional Law in the UK Supreme Court 
Lamprecht, Rolf. 2011. Ich gehe bis nach Karlsruhe. Eine Geschichte des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 
(DVA, 2011). In Herzkammern der Republik. Die Deutschen und das Bundesverfassungsgericht, ed. 
Michael Stolleis. German: C.H. Beck.
Limbach, Jutta. 1999. Die Akzeptanz verfassungsgerichtlicher Entscheidungen, Im Namen des Volkes, 
Macht und Verantwortung der Richter, 165. Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt Stuttgart.
Lord Neuberger. 2017. Rule of Law in UK at Risk After Brexit, Says Former Supreme Court President. In 
The Guardian, ed. Bowcott, Owen and Walker, Peter, Tue 21 Nov 2017.
Lord Reed at the Centre for Private Law. 2017. University of Edinburgh, Comparative Law in the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, 13 October 2017. https ://www.supre mecou rt.uk/news/speec 
hes.html#2017.
Manssen, Gerrit. 2014. Staastrecht II – Grundrechte. 11 Edition, para 179.
Manssen, Gerrit. 2015. Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit im deutschen Verfassungsrecht Aktuelle 
Entwicklungen in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. In The principle of propor-
tionality and the protection of the fundamental rights in the European states, ed. Szymaniec Piotr.
McIntyre, Jon. 2017. Do Courts have a Future in the Age of TRUMP? Bulletin (Law Society of South 
Australia) 39(5): 24.
Möller, Kai. 2012. Proportionality: Challenging the Critics. International Journal of Constitutional Law 
10(3): 709.
Murkens, Jo. 2017. Miller in the Supreme Court: a welcome reminder of the function of a constitution 
and the rule of law, LSE https ://blogs .lse.ac.uk/. Accessed 1 Dec 2017.
Qvortrup, Matt. 2015. New Developments: The Courts and Multi-Level Governance—Some Compara-
tive Perspectives on the Emerging Jurisprudence of the UK Supreme Court. Public Money & Man-
agement 35(1): 57–61.
Rosenfeld, Michel. 2012. Constitutional Identity. Michel Rosenfeld, 767. Andras Sajo: Comparative Con-
stitutional Law, Oxford University Press.
Scoutaris, Nikos. 2017. Territorial Differentiation in EU Law: Can Scotland and Northern Ireland Remain 
in the EU and/or the Single Market? Cambridge European Yearbook of European Law 19: 287.
Schwarze, Jürgen. 2006. European Administrative Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell.
Tomkins, Adam. 2017. Confusion and Retreat: The Supreme Court on Devolution, U.K. Const. L. Blog 
(19th Feb 2015). https ://ukcon stitu tiona llaw.org/. Accessed 8 Dec 2017.
von Bogdandy, Armin, and Peter Huber. 2017. The Max Planck Handbooks in European Public Law: The 
Administrative State, 672. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Voβkuhle, Andreas. 2015. Integration durch Recht, Der Beitrag des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Berlin: 
Audimax, Humboldt-Universitat zu.
Walker, Neil. 2014. Our Constitutional Unsettlement. Public Law 532: 535.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
